SPOUSAL BENEFITS AND THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978
I. INTRODUCTION

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)' is unusually
significant in that it overruled the United States Supreme Court's
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert2, wherein the Court held
that an employer's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its
weekly sickness and accident insurance plan did not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII, section 703(a)(1) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 While the impact of the PDA upon employment
4
practices as they relate to female employees seems quite evident,
important questions exist with regard to its impact, if any, upon
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, §§ 703-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (hereinafter Title VII which is codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
[hereinafter PDA] provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay
for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an
employer from providing abortion. benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
Id.
, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Id.
I at 145-46. Section 70 3 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1)(1976) and generally prohibits employment practices which discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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health insurance plans which provide some level of coverage for an
employee's spouse. 5 Simply stated, the issue is now whether Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination is violated when an employer
provides a comprehensive health insurance plan for employees and
their dependents but limits coverage of a spouse's maternity-related
expenses.
This Comment will analyze this narrow issue through the Supreme Court's holdings in the area of pregnancy discrimination, the
legislative history of the PDA, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretative guidelines on pregnancyrelated issues. Finally, the handful of recent federal court decisions on
this point will be discussed with particular emphasis placed on the
decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC 7 and EEOC v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,8 respectively.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Title VII's ProhibitionAgainst Sex Discrimination
Despite the pervasive effect which Title VII has had upon our
society, 9 the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
little indication of Congress' intent in including sex as a prohibited
basis of discrimination.' 0 The original House of Representatives bill,
which was eventually to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, did not
mention sex-based discrimination." Indeed, the sex provision was
introduced into the House as a last minute rider to the bill and then

'

An example is a health insurance plan which covers the full cost of a semiprivate hospital
room for 120 days for employees, their spouses, and dependent children between the ages of 14
and 19 years. Other necessary hospital and medical expenses during hospitalization are covered
at 100% of the initial $750 and 80% of the excess for 120 days with no special limits upon
expenses arising from the pregnancy-related disability of a female employee. The plan, however,
limits to $500 the benefits payable for the uncomplicated delivery of a child to the spouse of a
male employee. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir.), afJ'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
6 Since the Supreme Court had held in Gilbert that it was not discriminatory for an
employer to exclude coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities from a weekly disability insurance
plan, it never reached this issue.
7 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
8 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
' See B. SCHLaI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW xii (1976) (opining
"Title VII will affect the life of nearly every American alive today . . . in ways that were
undreamed of when the legislation was first proposed").
10 See generally Miller, Sex Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51
MINN. L. REv. 877 (1967).
11 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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only in an attempt to frustrate passage of the Civil Rights Act. 12 In the
Senate, however, the provision was neither challenged nor seriously
3
debated.'
Due to this lack of legislative guidance,1 4 the EEOC and the
courts were left with the task of interpreting the sex provision and its
boundaries. As was later apparent from the Supreme Court's rationale
in Gilbert, a Title VII formula equating sex-based discrimination and
pregnancy was not readily evident.15 Indeed, the EEOC's initial position on the pregnancy issue, taken in a 1966 opinion letter by the
General Counsel, was that Title VII was not violated by a salary
continuation program which excluded only those disabilities resulting
from pregnancy and childbirth.'
B. The EEOC's 1972 Guidelines
The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for the implementation of Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment
and is empowered to take action to prevent unlawful practices. 17 The
EEOC accepts and investigates charges, 8 issues findings, 19 conciliates
between the parties,2 0 seeks injunctive relief, 2' and when necessary,
brings its own action in federal district court to seek whatever relief is
appropriate and to compel compliance with Title VII. 22 Finally,

12 The inclusion of sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination was proposed by Representative
Howard Smith on the day prior to the passage of the Act. Representative Smith had opposed the
bill "and it is generally believed that his intention in including the sex amendment was to subvert
passage of the bill entirely." Underwood, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the
EEOC Guidelines: A Return to "Great Deference", 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 735, 737 (1980).
13 Miller, supra note 10, at 883.
", The sex provision has been described by one commentator as an "orphan," in that "neither
the proponents nor the opponents of Title VII seem to have felt any responsibility for its presence
in the bill." Berg, Equal Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV.
62, 79 (1964); see Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 143 ("legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity").
"s See infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
" See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142. A few weeks after the issuance of the General Counsel's
October 17, 1966 letter, the EEOC issued another opinion letter stating that "an insurance or
other benefit plan may simply exclude maternity as a covered risk, and such an exclusion would
not in our view be discriminatory." Id. at 143 (quoting opinion letter of EEOC's General
Counsel).
"7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
"8 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
10 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1982).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
I'
12 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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Congress has given the EEOC authority to promulgate procedural
regulations designed to implement Title VII's policy of nondiscrimina23
tion.
With regard to the substantive aspects of Title VII, e.g., what
constitutes religious or national origin discrimination in employment
or how a pregnant employee's medical leave of absence is to be
handled, the EEOC is limited to rendering interpretations. 24 These
interpretations, oftentimes issued in the form of guidelines,2 5 lack the
force of legislative rules and are accorded varying degrees of deference
by the federal courts. 26 It is against this backdrop that the EEOC's
guidelines with regard to pregnancy discrimination must be considered.

23 Id.

§ 2000e-12(e). In its exercise of this authority, the EEOC must observe the require-

ments of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 12(a) (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act provides for the promulgation of federal agency
rules in two manners. An informal procedure can be followed whereby the agency publishes
proposed rules in the Federal Register, invites public comment, and then issues the rules in final
form. A formal procedure is also set forth, whereby the agency conducts a formal hearing which
in many ways is similar to a trial. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1976).
22 The Supreme Court has held that the EEOC lacks the authority to promulgate substantive
regulations pursuant to Title VII. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)). Thus, EEOC interpretations regarding the substantive
aspects of Title VII neither have the force of law nor supply the basis for imposing liability. Id.
It has been said that once the Legislature has granted an agency the power to adopt
substantive rules, "the rules the agency makes ... have the same force as a statute" if the rules
are constitutional and do not overstep the agency's statutory authority since "a court may no
more substitute its judgment as to the content of a legislative rule than it may substitute its
judgment as to the content of a statute." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 126 (1972). The
EEOC could use this authority advantageously in its enforcement function. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), for example, is empowered to "prevent persons, partnerships or corporations .. .from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976). The FTC has,
in turn, used its congressional grant of rulemaking authority to promulgate substantive rules
which proscribe certain practices, e.g., the failure to post octane ratings on service station
gasoline pumps. Accordingly, if the rule is properly promulgated and is within both constitutional and statutory boundaries, the inquiry at a subsequent enforcement proceeding may be
limited to whether there has been compliance with the rule rather than the propriety of the rule
itself. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
" See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1982) (setting forth the EEOC's position regarding
"Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth").
2' The criteria for determining the degree of deference owed to agency
interpretations have
been set forth by the Supreme Court: "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The
PDA is the focal point in the latest round of debate regarding the quantum of judicial deference
owed to the guidelines of the EEOC. For the best general discussion of this issue, see Underwood, supra note 12.
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The EEOC issued its first formal statement concerning employment practices relating to pregnancy and childbirth in 1972.27 These
guidelines provided, in essence, that: 1) an employment policy which
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy is a prima facie violation of
Title VII; 28 2) "[d]isabilities caused, or contributed to by pregnancy,
miscarriage, abortion, childbirth and recovery therefrom" are temporary disabilities; 29 and, 3) if a temporarily disabled employee is terminated as a result of the employer's leave policy, or lack thereof, such
termination violates the Act if employees of one sex are disparately
affected and the policy is not justified by business necessity.3 0 These
guidelines were subsequently validated by every court of appeals
3
which considered them prior to Gilbert. 1
C. The Supreme Court and Pregnancy Discrimination
Although Gilbert was the Supreme Court's initial consideration
of the pregnancy question under Title VII, the court had previously
dealt with the issue under the equal protection clause in Geduldig v.
Aiello. 32 Geduldig involved a California disability benefits plan which
specifically excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from its coverage. 33 A female participant challenged the constitutionality of the
27 In his dissenting opinion in Gilbert, Justice Brennan noted that the 1972 guidelines were
preceded by seven years of study on the role of pregnancy in the labor market and a review by
the EEOC of its own case decisions on maternity. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 156-57 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
28 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1973).
2. Id. § 1604.10(b).
30 Id. § 1604.10(c).
11 See Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975) (denial of accumulated
seniority for job bidding purposes while employee is on pregnancy-caused sick leave violates Title
VII), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist.,
519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (school board's refusal to grant sick leave benefits for normal
pregnancy violates Title VII), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519
F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) (disability benefit plan which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities
from coverage violates Title VII), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089
(5th Cir. 1975) (EEOC's pregnancy discrimination guidelines are entitled to "great deference";
Title VII violation may exist in absence of equal protection violation); Holthaus v. Compton &
Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975) (termination of employee due to pregnancy-related disability
while others were not terminated for other temporary disabilities violates Title VII); Communications Workers of America v. A.T. & T. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d. Cir. 1975) (allegation that
employer excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from disability benefit plan presents Title VII
claim), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Co. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975)
(income protection plan which covers all forms of temporary disabilities except pregnancy
violates Title VII), vacated on jurisdictionalgrounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
32 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
11 Id. at 487-89. The plan covered individuals in private employment and was established
pursuant to state law. Participating employees contributed one percent of his or her salary via
payroll deductions to an annual maximum of $85 with such monies being paid into California's
unemployment compensation disability fund. Id.
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plan, claiming that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
constituted sex discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amend34
ment's equal protection guarantee.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, set forth the proposition
that pregnancy-based distinctions did not always constitute genderbased classifications for equal protection purposes.3 5 The majority
stated that potential recipients of benefits under the California plan
could be divided into two groups--"pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. ' 36 Since the latter group contains both males and females, the court held that the plan was not gender-based. 37 Thus,
legislators were not constitutionally prohibited from making reasonable distinctions with regard to pregnancy "[a]bsent a showing that
distinctions . . . are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.- 38 The
Court concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
39
from coverage simply did not amount to invidious discrimination.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent which he would reiterate in Gilbert,
viewed the plan's pregnancy-related disability exclusion quite differently.40 He argued that even though men were fully compensated for
all disabilities, including male-specific conditions, e.g., prostatectomies and circumcision, female employees did not receive complete
coverage.41 Justice Brennan concluded that such dissimilar treatment
resulted in sex discrimination because the basis of the distinction
revolved around "physical characteristics inextricably linked to one
sex. "42
Some two years after its decision in Geduldig, the Supreme Court
tackled the issue anew in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.43 While the
facts in Gilbert did not differ significantly from Geduldig,44 the issue
Id. at 490.
11 Id. at 496 n.20.
36 Id.
37 Id.
34

Id.
39 Id. at
38

494.

Justice Brennan was joined in his dissent by Justices Douglas and Marshall. See id. at 497505 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42 Id. Justice Brennan bolstered his position by referring to the EEOC's 1972 pregnancy
discrimination guidelines. Id.
13 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
44 Id. at 128. General Electric Company provided a weekly, nonoccupational sickness and
accident disability benefit plan for all its employees which excluded from its coverage those
disabilities arising from pregnancy. Id. Benefits were paid at a rate equal to 60% of the
employee's normal straight time weekly earnings. Id. Payments normally commenced with the
eighth day of total disability and continued for a maximum of 26 weeks for any one continuous
period of disability or for successive periods of disability if due to the same or related causes. Id.
40
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was for the first time presented in the context of a Title VII challenge. 45 Although the challenge was based on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
found the Geduldig analysis to be controlling. 4 He based this conclusion on similarities that exist between Title VII language and reasoning embodied in prior court decisions construing the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, as well as Congress' failure to
define discrimination in Title VII. 47 Justice Rehnquist concluded that
"an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan providing
general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all,' ' 48 and
additionally found that the exclusion was not a "mere 'pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other.' -49 In so holding, the majority emphasized the
district court's characterization of pregnancy as a condition that is not
a disease and is often a "voluntarily undertaken and desired condition."5 0 Justice Rehnquist seemingly argued that the very nature-of the
condition tended to negate any inference of pretext. 51
Having analyzed the issue from the apparent standpoint of the
"disparate treatment" theory of discrimination, wherein intentional
differences in treatment must be shown, the court turned to an "impact" or "effect" analysis. "[U]pon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against
members of one class or another," a prima facie Title VII violation is
established. 52 The majority ruled that the plaintiff had not even at45 Id.
41

Id. at 136.

11Id.

Justice Rehnquist prefaced this argument, however, by noting that the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not support the inference which he drew regarding the
application of equal protection analysis to a Title VII case. Id. at 133.
41 Id. at 136.

4 Id. (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
50

See id.

"' See id. at 136-40. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist characterized pregnancy as an "additional
risk, unique to women" that may go uncompensated without affecting the parity of a benefit
package. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
5" Id. at 136-37 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court described the two major theories
of discrimination in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) as follows:
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. . . . Undoubtedly disparate
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title
VII.
.. . Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neu-
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tempted to show a discriminatory gender-based effect without which
53
no violation of section 703(a)(1) could exist.
In reaching its conclusion that General Electric's plan did not
discriminate on the basis of sex, the Gilbert majority gave no weight
to the EEOC's 1972 guidelines. 54 Justice Rehnquist noted that as mere
interpretations of Title VII the guidelines did not carry the force of
law. 55 Furthermore, whatever persuasive value the guidelines might
have had was entirely negated, in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, because
the guidelines were enacted long after the statute, contradicted the
5 and were, at any rate, conEEOC's initial position on the matter,
57
trary to section 703(h) of Title VII.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, categorically rejected each argument upon which the majority based its decision. 58 First, he questioned the majority's characterization of the pregnancy exclusion as
gender-neutral by stating the common sense notion that a pregnancybased distinction is, at the minimum, "strongly 'sex related.' -59 Second, he cast considerable doubt upon the majority's treatment of the
tral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discrimiEither
natory motive, . . . is not required under a disparate impact theory ....
theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.
Id. at 335 n.15 (citations omitted).
" 429 U.S. at 137 n.15.
14 Id. at 142-43.
IId.
'
Id. at 142-45.
IId. at 143-44. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1) (1976) provides that employers shall not discriminate
on the basis of sex by paying different wages for work within
any establishment . . . the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
Id.
Section 703(h) of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-z(h) (1976)), links Title
VII to the Equal Pay Act and provides in pertinent part that "'ilt shall not be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of
sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of
such employer if such differentiation is authorized by [pertinent provisions of the Equal Pay
Act].- Justice Rehnquist concluded that the pregnancy exclusion could not violate Title VII
because an interpretation of the Equal Pay Act issued by the Wage and Hour Administrator
would authorize the exclusion. 429 U.S. at 144 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975)). Justice
Rehnquist felt constrained to defer to this interpretation. Id. at 145.
" See 429 U.S. at 146-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While Justice Brennan was content to
rebut the majority's application of the Geduldig analysis to a Title VII case, Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, wholly rejected equal protection scrutiny in such a matter. Id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
" Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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pretext issue by highlighting the district court's undisturbed conclusion that General Electric had long shown a discriminatory attitude
toward its female employees. 0 Third, he totally rejected Justice
Rehnquist's characterization of pregnancy as an additional risk which
may be lawfully excluded from the coverage of the plan.6 1 Finally, he
would have accorded great deference to the EEOC's 1972 guidelines
in light of the apparently careful and studied consideration that preceded their enactment.

62

A year after its decision in Gilbert, the Supreme Court once again
addressed the pregnancy discrimination issue in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.6 3 In that case, two distinct employment practices were at issue:
1) pregnant employees did not receive sick pay while on leave of
absence; and 2) employees returning from pregnancy leave were denied accumulated seniority while employees on leave for other disabilities continued to accumulate seniority. 4 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, followed the Gilbert rationale regarding the former
practice and found that no Title VII violation existed. 5 He observed,
however, that the latter practice, while facially neutral, violated
section 703(a)(2) of Title VII because a substantial burden was placed
upon female employees which was not placed on their male counterparts.66 The majority distinguished Gilbert and observed that while
Title VII does not require that one sex receive more economic benefits
than the other, it does not allow the imposition of a burden which
could adversely affect the employment opportunities of female employees.6 7 While Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the benefits/burdens distinction is "more than one of semantics",6 8 he provided no
inkling as to either the basis for such distinctions or its relationship to
the judicially-created disparate treatment-disparate impact rubric of
69
Title VII.

Although Gilbert and Satty are the Supreme Court's only pregnancy discrimination decisions in the context of Title VII, the Court's
1978 ruling in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.

65

Id. at 149-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 27.

64

434 U.S. 136 (1977).
Id. at 138.

61

Ild. at 143-46.
o Id. at 142.
67 Id.

Id.
"I Id. For the Supreme Court's description of the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of discrimination, see supra note 52.
68
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Manhart70 raises intriguing questions regarding the approach the
Court might take in a future pregnancy discrimination case. In
Manhart, the employer required its female employees to make greater
periodic contributions to its pension fund than male employees. 7' The
difference in contributions was based upon the employer's determination that its female employees were likely to live longer than its male
employees and thereby draw more pension money, on the average,
72
than the males.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, a dissenter in
Gilbert, the Court held that the employer's contribution requirement
violated Title VII. 73 The majority stated that although the parties
7
accepted the factual accuracy of the mortality-rate generalization,'
Title VII's protection applies to individuals rather than a class of
individuals. 75 Thus, while the sex-based generalization was both true
and fair regarding the class, the higher contribution rate nonetheless
discriminated against individual female employees, since each may
76
not have fit the generalization.
Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish Gilbert by noting that
General Electric's plan was not gender-based since the group of
nonpregnant persons included members of both sexes, whereas in
Manhart the line of demarcation was based strictly upon sex. 77 This
explanation of Gilbert does little, if anything, to harmonize the two
decisions. If Title VII's protection against sex discrimination accrues
to individuals and not classes, then the woman who is pregnant should
not lose such protection merely because other persons within a courtcreated class are not pregnant. This would seem to be Manhart's
mandate. Moreover, just as any particular female employee may not
outlive her male counterpart, so too may any particular female employee, and only such employee, become pregnant and thereby leave
the group of nonpregnant persons altogether. Justice Stevens was
almost conspicuous in his failure to address these conflicts inherent in
the Gilbert and Manhart analyses.
It appears, therefore, that if the PDA had not been enacted, the
seeming shift in the Court's approach to gender-based discrimination
signalled by Manhart might have required a different result in a
o 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Id. at 704.
I'
72

Id.

71
74
75
71
77

Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 715-16.

1983]

COMMENT

333

future Gilbert-type case. 78 At the very least, the Court's analytical
approach to gender-based discrimination is in need of clarification.
III.

PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND

1979

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION GUIDELINES

A. Legislative History
The manner in which the Ninety-Fifth Congress has attempted to
negate Gilbert is deceptively straightforward in that the PDA merely
amended the definitional section of Title VI

9

by adding subsection

(k) which provides in pertinent part, that "[t]he terms 'because of sex'
or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on
80
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
As a result of this legislative definition of sex, "discrimination based on
pregnancy .

.

. is discrimination based on sex," for Title VII pur-

poses."' While the PDA does not necessarily require employers to
implement new programs solely for the benefit of pregnant employees, it does require that such employees "be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. '8 2 Thus, if
an employer did not provide disability benefits, for instance, for any
of its employees prior to the PDA, that employer need not have
83
provided any such benefits after the enactment of the PDA.
Prior to considering that part of the PDA's legislative history
which impacts specifically upon the spousal benefit issue, two conclusions set forth in both the House and Senate committee reports on the

78 Justice Blackmun indicates as much in his separate opinion in Manhart. See Manhart, 435
U.S. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
79 Title VII defines the terms person, employee, employment agency, labor organization,
employer, commerce, industry affecting commerce, State, religion, and as a result of the PDAsex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(k) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979).
S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
82 H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD.
NEws 4749, 4752 [hereinafter cited as HouSE REPORT]; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3-4;
see also Barone v. Hackett, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1765 (D.R.I. 1982) (PDA does not
require employer mandated by state law to transmit compulsory employee contributions to state
temporary disability benefits fund that provided lesser benefits for pregnancy than for other
disabilities to supplement such benefits).
83 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. While the PDA became effective on October 31, 1978,
employers had until April 29, 1979 to make necessary adjustments in existing fringe benefit or
insurance programs. Further, employers were required to wait until October 31, 1979 or until
the expiration of an applicable collective bargaining agreement before the benefits of an existing
plan could be reduced in order to comply with the PDA. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 2, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978).
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then proposed legislation should be noted. 84 First, each report stated
that the EEOC's 1972 guidelines were correct interpretations of Title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. 85 Second, each committee also
reported that the dissenting justices in Gilbert had properly interpreted the sex provision of Title VII. 8 In particular, the Senate Committee on Human Resources specifically approved the "commonsense"
approach and analysis of Justice Brennan in Gilbert and stated that
87
the proposed legislation reflected this view.
Still, no definitive answer to the spousal benefit question emerges
from the two committee reports. Each report makes frequent references to working women and pregnant workers, 8 apparently supporting the view that the PDA was intended to extend Title VII protection
only to female employees and not to the spouses of male employees.
Yet, the Senate Report does directly address the spousal benefit issue
in its consideration of the bill's effect on medical benefit plans. 89 The
Senate committee first opined that very few employers actually provided comprehensive medical coverage for spouses of female employees while denying coverage to spouses of male employees. 90 The committee proceeded to note that while it certainly did not wish to
encourage these plans, their lawfulness "would be determined on the
basis of existing title VII principles."'"
Statements made by various legislators during the floor debates
on the PDA fail to reveal an unequivocal congressional intent on the
spousal benefit question. Certain remarks made by former New Jersey
Senator Harrison Williams apparently support the view that the PDA
84 The House Report was submitted by the Committee on Education and Labor and the
Senate Report was submitted by the Committee on Human Resources.
85 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 82, at 2, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4750.
86 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3-4; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 82, at 4-5, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4752-53.
7 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
88 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3 (bill "was introduced to change the definition of
sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect the "commonsense' view and to insure that working
women are protected against all forms of employment discrimination based on sex"); HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 82, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4751 (bill
requires that "pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their
ability or inability to work).
89 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 6.
80 Id. The Committee's presumption was apparently ill-founded.
One survey has reported
that prior to the PDA, it was common for employers to limit coverage of the maternity-related
expenses of dependents. Brief for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States at
23 exhibit 3, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.),
aJJ'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec.
7, 1982) (No. 82-411) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce].
1 SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 6.
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was not intended to cover spousal benefits.92 In particular, when
asked during the floor debate whether the PDA applied only to the
female employee who has become pregnant after being hired, Senator
Williams responded: "[e]xactly." 9 3 Senators Bayh and Cranston, how-
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LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 200-01 (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Senator Williams had introduced S. 995 and chaired
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. In introducing the Conference Report to

the whole Senate he stated:
Because of the Supreme Court's decision in the Gilbert case, this legislation is
necessary to provide fundamental protection against sex discrimination for our
Nation's 42 million working women. This protection will go a long way toward
insuring that American women are permitted to assume their rightful place in our
Nation's economy.
In addition to providing protection to working women with regard to fringe
benefit programs, such as health and disability insurance programs, this legislation
will prohibit other employment policies which adversely affect pregnant workers.
Id. See generally Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.. 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1950) ("[i]t is
the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt"); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967): NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1954).
13 123 CONG. REc. 15,039 (1977). It should be noted, however, that Senator Williams made
this response in discussing the bill's impact upon income maintenance plans. See id. An income
maintenance or disability plan protects an employee from loss of wages while not at work due to
a disability. ROBEaTS DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 286 (1966). The full text of the
relevant portions of their dialogue is as follows:
[Mr. Hatch]: Let me go a little bit further. The phrase "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions," appearing on page 2, lines 1 and 2,
appears to be overly broad, and is not limited in terms of employment. It does not
even require that the person so affected be pregnant.
Indeed, under the present language of the bill, it is arguable that spouses of male
employees are covered by this civil rights amendment. One might even argue that
other female dependents are covered. And what about the status of a woman
coworker who is not pregnant but resides with a pregnant woman and cannot get to
work once the pregnant female commences her maternity leave or the employed
mother who stays home to nurse her pregnant daughter? Are they women "affected
by" pregnancy? Could the sponsors clarify exactly whom that phrase intends to
cover?

[Mr. Williams]: With regard to more maintenance plans for pregnancy-related
disabilities, I do not see how this language could be misunderstood.
[Mr. Hatch]: Because it is very broadly drafted and if we say "affected by" it, that
includes all of those illustrations that I have just enumerated. If it does not, I want to
be sure that everybody knows from the record that it only refers to the woman
employee who is pregnant or who becomes pregnant after her employment.
[Mr. Williams]: If there is any ambiguity, with regard to income maintenance plans,
I cannot see it. "... shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes."
I do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy other than the pregnancy that
relates to the employee, and if there is any ambiguity, let it be clear here and now
that this is very precise. It deals with a woman, a woman who is an employee, an
employee in a work situation where all disabilities are covered under a company
plan that provides income maintenance in the event of medical disability; that her
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ever, both sponsors of the Senate bill, spoke directly about the spousal
benefit issue, noting that it would be discriminatory for an employer
to provide comprehensive coverage for the dependents of female employees while providing less than complete coverage for the dependents of male employees.9 4 Congressmen Weiss and Sarasin expressed
similar views during a colloquy with EEOC representatives.15 At best
then, a review of the PDA's legislative history yields conflicting signals
as to Congress' intent with regard to dependents' benefits. The
EEOC, however, has taken a definitive position on the subject.

particular period of disability, when she cannot work because of childbirth or
anything related to childbirth is excluded. It is narrowly drawn and would not give
any employee the right to obtain income maintenance as a result of the pregnancy of
someone who is not an employee.
[Mr. Hatch]: OK; or the effects on other people as a result of the pregnancy of any
female employee.
[Mr. Williams]: Exactly, it does not.
[Mr. Hatch]: So the Senator is satisfied that, though the committee language I
brought up, "woman affected by pregnancy" seems to be ambiguous, what it means
is that this act only applies to the particular woman who is actually pregnant, who is
an employee and has become pregnant after her employment?
[Mr. Williams]: Exactly.
123 CONG. REC. 15038-39 (1977).
Representative Augustus F. Hawkins who introduced the House bill and chaired the House
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities and Senator Jacob Javits, ranking minority member of the Senate's Human Resources Committee, also made general statements that the respective bills were aimed at "pregnant woman employees" or "pregnant workers." LEGISLATIVE
HIsTORY, supra note 92, at 66-67, 166. Additionally, numerous statements were made by
proponents of the Acts which support the view that Congress did not intend to extend protection
to spouses. See, e.g., id. at 8, 23-25, 70-71, 168-70, 172, 177-80, 182, 185.
11 123 CONG. REc. 29,642, 29,663 (1977).
95 Proposed Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Hearingson H.R. 5955
and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-88 (1977). The pertinent portions of that
colloquy are:
[Mr. Weiss]: [W]ould the amendment that we are talking about address itself or
provide pregnancy benefits for the wife of the worker?
[Commissioner Walsh]: [lit is our position from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's position, that benefits must be equal.
[Mr. Weiss]: As I got the thrust of oral testimony today, and in fact it was my
impression that the employer was to cover the dependents of the employees. I
wanted to be sure that that, in fact, was disposed of, and that later on we are not
subjected to an attack on the legislation because of some lack of clarity as to what we
are talking about.
[Mr. Sarasin]: Just to pick up on Mr. Weiss's comment, I think that this is the correct
interpretation of the witness's statement earlier. I don't see how you can read the bill
any other way.
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B. The EEOC's 1979 Guidelines
Predictably, the EEOC has formally adopted the position that if
an employer provides medical insurance coverage for the spouses of its
female employees, it must provide equivalent medical expense coverage for the wives of male employees, including conditions related to
pregnancy.96 If followed by all employers subject to Title VII, 97 this
standard would no doubt result in an aggregate of millions of dollars
of increased cost for those employers who would be required to equalize coverage."
The EEOC adopted its spousal benefits policy as part of its
revised guidelines on pregnancy discrimination. 9 Section (a) of the
9129 C.F.R. § 1604.11 app. at 140 (1982). This position has been adopted in a series of
questions and answers provided by the EEOC. The pertinent provisions provide:
21.Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the medical
expenses of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouses of male employees? Of the
dependents of all employees?
A. Where an employer provides no coverage for dependents, the employer is
not required to institute such coverage. However, if an employer's insurance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employees, then it must
equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of male employees, including those
arising from pregnancy-related conditions.
But the insurance does not have to cover the pregnancy-related conditions of
other dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related conditions of the
dependents of male and female employees equally.
22.Q. Must an employer provide the same level of health insurance coverage
for the pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of male employees as it
provides for its female employees?
A. No. It is not necessary to provide the same level of coverage for the pregnancy-related medical conditions of spouses of male employees as for female employees. However, where the employer provides coverage for the medical conditions of
the spouses of its employees, then the level of coverage for pregnancy- related medical
conditions of the spouses of male employees must be the same as the level of coverage
for all other medical conditions of the spouses of female employees. For example, if
the employer covers employees for 100 percent of reasonable and customary expenses
sustained for a medical condition, but only covers dependent spouses for 50 percent
of reasonable and customary expenses for their medical conditions, the pregnancyrelated expenses of the male employee's spouse must be covered at the 50 percent
level.
Id.
97 Only those employers having at least 15 employees,
who have been on the job each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year are subject to
the prohibitions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
" See Brief for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce, supra note 90, at 23 exhibit 1 (FMC
Corporation estimated increased annual cost of $937,400 commencing September 1, 1980 for
compliance with PDA).
o9 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1982). The EEOC had initially published an "Adoption of Interim
Interpretive Guidelines, Questions and Answers" on the same subject in the Federal Register. See
44 Fed. Reg. 13,278 (1979). Following a 30 day comment period, the guidelines were republished in final form. This procedure was presumably followed to enhance the likelihood that
these guidelines would be accorded "great deference" by the federal courts. See Underwood,
supra note 12, at 745-49.
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guidelines sets forth basic policy regarding pregnancy discrimination'0 0 while section (b) announces the substantive requirement that
"[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions . . .shall be treated the same as "other
disabilities for all job-related purposes." 10' Section (c) prevents wrongful termination 0 2 and section (d) sets forth PDA compliance dates.10 3
In addition to its actual guidelines on pregnancy discrimination,
the EEOC included an appendix of 37 questions and answers104 in
purported response to concerns raised by employers, employees, unions, and insurers regarding their rights and duties under the PDA.
The Commission's position on the spousal benefit issue is expressed in
response to questions 21 and 22 and provides, in essence: 1) If an
employer provides no coverage for dependents of its employees, it is
not required to institute coverage; 2) if spousal coverage is provided
for female employees, the spouses of male employees must be equally
covered; and 3) the proper comparison for Title VII purposes is the
level of coverage afforded spouses rather than female spouses vis 6 vis
female employees. 105 As the following review of recent spousal benefit
cases indicates, the federal courts have accorded varying weight to
these interpretations.
IV.

RECENT SPOUSAL BENEFIT LITIGATION

A. The Federal District Courts
At the writing of this Comment, five decisions had been issued by
district courts analyzing the spousal benefit issue, two of which have
been reviewed by their respective circuit courts.' 06 Although the employee benefit plans at issue vary from case to case, 10 7 each provides
1- 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1982).
101Id. § 1604.10(b).
"02Id. § 1604.10(c); see supra text accompanying note 30.
103 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(d) (1982).
"I,See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 app. (1982).
105 Id. § 1604.11 app. at 140-41.
106 EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); United Teachers-Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., No. 81-2121 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn
Mfg. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. 111.1981); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1981), afJ'd, 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d
448 (4th Cir.), afJ'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
107 CompareEEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 154 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (employer
offered various health insurance plans to employees with availability of plans depending upon
particular employee's classification. Each plan covered medical expenses of employee's spouse
but placed limitation upon pregnancy-related hospital and medical expenses of spouses that did
not exist with respect to other medical expenses incurred by a spouse) with supra note 5 (detailing
medical plan at issue in Newport News).
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some coverage for the medical expenses of employees' spouses with a
limitation placed upon pregnancy-related expenses. The facts are not
usually in dispute 08 and the plaintiff ordinarily claims that the plan's
limitation upon spousal pregnancy-related expenses "discriminate[s]
against male employees, on the basis of sex with respect to their
compensation. "109
Four district courts which have considered the issue have found
that these plans do not discriminate against male employees. 0 In the
first case to be decided, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC,"' the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia determined that the "clear legislative intent" underlying
the PDA was to insure only that working women were protected
against sex discrimination." 2 The court then highlighted that portion
of the Senate Report which specifically addressed dependents' benefits
and concluded that the sole issue was whether such a plan constitutes
an unlawful employment practice "under the existing principles of
13
Title VII.""
In analyzing the existing principles of Title VII, the district court
observed that regarding gender-based discrimination, " 'the PDA
carved out a narrow exception with respect to female employees or
applicants for employment.' ""14 Otherwise, the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Gilbert remain unchanged." 5 In particular,
the court noted that the Supreme Court had held in both Geduldig
and Gilbert that Title VII was not violated by the mere exclusion from
a disability plan of pregnancy-related benefits, unless there is a show-

'01 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 5, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]; see also EEOC
v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 155 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
"o EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 154-55 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
'10 EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg.
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1981), afJ'd, 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d
448 (4th Cir.), afJ'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
' 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 682
F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
112 Id. at 69 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3).
"13 Id. at 70.
114 Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3).
115Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:323

ing of gender-based impact." 6 Since the court found that the EEOC
11 7
had not made this showing, it held that Title VII was not violated.
While the district court considered the EEOC's guidelines in its
evaluation of legislative intent, it did not find them dispositive.1 8 To
the contrary, the court rejected the guidelines as directly contradicting the Title VII principles set forth in Gilbert and constituting an
attempt to accomplish precisely what Congress had left for determination on the basis of existing Title VII principles." 9 Moreover, the court
noted that the EEOC had, in the past, contradicted itself on the
20
meaning of the sex provision.1
In the next district court case, EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co. ,121 the EEOC argued that the legislative history of the PDA
indicated only that Congress was not willing to extend disability
benefit coverage to dependents. 22 The court rejected this argument,
however, as a "technical distinction between medical and disability
benefits" which Congress had not drawn 23 and fundamentally
adopted the rationale of Newport News.
In EEOC v. Joslyn Manufacturing Co., 124 the third district court
to consider the spousal benefit issue also followed the reasoning of
Newport News and held, as a matter of law, that the health insurance
plan at issue did not discriminate against male employees. 125 Although
the Joslyn Manufacturing court purported to independently review
the legislative history of the PDA in arriving at its decision, no new
insights were offered. 12 Indeed, the court merely selected four passages from the House and Senate reports on the then proposed legislation which, in its view, "suffice[d] to demonstrate the intent of Congress to establish only a remedy for pregnancy-related disabilities of

116 Id. at 68. The court did not address the common conclusion of the Senate and House
Reports that the Gilbert dissenters had correctly interpreted Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
117 510 F. Supp. at 71. The court reasoned that since the PDA did not apply to spousal
benefits, the result was controlled by Gilbert. Id.
is Id.
'I

Id.

120Id. The court was apparently referring to the 1966 EEOC opinion letter which was
reversed by the EEOC's 1972 guidelines. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
12 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aJf'd, 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.
1982).
122 Id.

at 1209.

Id. at 1209-10. The court made reference to the dialogue between Senators Hatch and
Williams, see supra note 95, and concluded that "Senator Hatch also did not draw this distinction in his colloquy with Senator Williams." 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1210.
124 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
125 Id. at 1144.
123

126 See id. at 1143.

1983]

COMMENT

working women." 2 7 The court dismissed the contrary statements of
Senators Bayh and Cranston 2 and Representatives Sarasin and
Weiss1 29 as not reflecting congressional intent and instead, emphasized the dialogue on the Senate floor between Senators Hatch and
Williams. 130
Yet, Joslyn Manufacturing is more provocative for what it fails to
do than for that which it provides. If the court was indeed persuaded
by Newport News, there should have been discussion of existing Title
VII principles and their application to the spousal benefit issue. At the
very least, a finding was required concerning whether the EEOC had
shown a gender-based effect. These two important elements of the
Newport News analysis were simply omitted, without explanation, by
the Joslyn Manufacturing court.
While the three district courts which had considered the spousal
benefit issue implied that the question was easily answered, the fourth
district court which considered the issue treated the matter quite
differently. In United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Board of
Education 31 the United States District Court for the Central District
of California held that the insurance programs at issue discriminated
against male employees on the basis of their sex. 32 The United Teachers court began its consideration of the issue with yet another assessment of the PDA's legislative history. The court determined that the
remarks of Senators Bayh, Cranston, Hatch, and Williams were simply inconclusive as to congressional intent regarding spousal benefits.133 Rather, the court moved directly to that part of the Senate
Report which specifically addressed dependents' benefits and like the
Newport News district court dedided that existing Title VII principles
34
would govern. 1
The United Teachers court's application of existing Title VII
principles, however, differed in all material aspects from that of
the Newport News court. The court pointed out that it could
find no support for the view that "the PDA was intended to reverse
[Gilbert] only as to the pregnancy related expenses of working women
127 Id. The court's reference to the PDA as establishing a remedy for working women casts
doubt upon its understanding of the manner in which the PDA amended Title VII.
128 See supra text accompanying note 94.

29

See supra note 95.

11 524 F. Supp. at 1144. See supra note 93.
13' No. 81-2121 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982). It should be noted, however, that this case was
decided after the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had reversed the district court in
Newport News.
132 United Teachers, slip op. at 12.
133 Id. at 8.
"3

Id. at 10.
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themselves" 1 35 and concluded that "it would be inconsistent with Title
VII to construe the PDA to have the limited effect of protecting solely
women employees." 1 3 The court found the dissenting opinions in
Gilbert to be controlling as to existing Title VII principles instead of
the residual majority opinion upon which the district court in Newport News had relied. 37 Furthermore, unlike prior decisions, the
United Teachers court accorded the EEOC guidelines great deference, in view of that agency's role in interpreting and implementing
38
Title VII. 1
The United Teachers court apparently reasoned 1 39 that the PDA
had entirely negated the majority opinion in Gilbert and elevated the
dissenting opinions in that case to "existing Title VII principles" status. Thus, the court appears to be stating that when Justice Brennan's
common sense approach to gender-based discrimination is considered
in conjunction with the EEOC's guidelines and the strong national
policy against sex discrimination in employment, the only conclusion
to be drawn is that these insurance programs unlawfully discriminate
40
against male employees.
The most recent district court decision rendered regarding
spousal benefits is EEOC v. Emerson Electric Co.141 in which the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
granted an employer's motion for summary judgment holding that the
PDA was inapplicable to dependents' benefits and the plan was not
otherwise unlawful under pre-existing Title VII principles. 42 While
the court also purported to independently consider the legislative
history of the PDA, 43 its analysis mirrored that of the district court in
Newport News. Indeed, the Emerson Electric court also concluded
that "[t]he PDA applies only to employees and applicants for employment", relying upon the Hatch-Williams dialogue for support. 144 The
court then considered the issue pursuant to pre-existing Title VII law
135Id. at 9.
136 Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir.), affd per curiam. 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted. 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411)).
131 Id. at 10.
'38 Id. at 11.
1'9United Teachers is written in the form of 19 somewhat terse "Conclusions of Law" which
do not fully reveal the court's reasoning process. See id. at 6-12.
140Id. at 11. The court intimated that a contrary ruling would effectively recreate the
scenario which gave rise to the PDA. See id.
"1' 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982). Emerson Electric was also decided subsequent to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Newport News.
142 539 F. Supp. at 154, 159.
143 Id. at 156; see also supra text accompanying note
126.
144 539 F. Supp. 156-57. See supra note
93.
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and adopted the Newport News principle that "Gilbert is a vital with
respect to [dependents' benefits] as it would have been before the
45
enactment of the PDA."'1

The court's application of Gilbert to the spousal benefit issue was
somewhat novel, if not altogether convincing. Like General Electric's
disability benefits plan, the court maintained that the insurance plan
at issue "divides recipients into two groups-employees with pregnant
spouses and employees without pregnant spouses."'

46

Since the latter

group contained members of both sexes, Gilbert indicates that the
plan did not discriminate on the basis of sex.' 47 As to the weight to be
given the EEOC's guidelines, the court concluded that the guidelines
were contrary to congressional intent and thus were entitled to no
deference.

48

B. A Split in the Circuits
Decisions on the spousal benefit issue have been rendered by the
Fourth and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals in Newport News and
Lockheed Missiles, respectively. The former decision reversed and the
latter decision affirmed analogous rulings of the respective district
courts, thereby creating a difference of opinion at the federal appellate level.
The Fourth Circuit court, in a holding which was subsequently
affirmed per curiam,149 was the first federal court to find a Title VII
violation with regard to an insurance plan limiting coverage for a
spouse's pregnancy-related expenses.' 5 0 The circuit court's decision in
Newport News was unique not only in its result but also in its analysis
of the underlying issue.
In deciding the case, the court relied primarily upon a strict
interpretation of the PDA's language. While the employer argued that
the PDA had only altered Gilbert with regard to female employees
and applicants for employment, the Fourth Circuit court maintained
that "[t]he language of the statute is tortured by that construction.'

15

'

The court supported its decision by noting the natural harmony which
supposedly exists between the first and second clauses of the PDA.
145 539 F. Supp. at 158. The Emerson Electric court offered no explanation for its determination that the issue was to be decided pursuant to pre-existing Title VII principles.
"' Id. at 158-59.
147 Id. at 159.
1- Id.
' Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), aff'd per
curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982)
(No. 82-411).
's
's'

667 F.2d at 451.
Id. at 450.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

344

[Vol. 13:323

With regard to the second clause of the PDA, the court stated
that "[w]hen an employer considers extension of medical benefits to
the spouses of employees, it does so with an 'employment-related
purpose' just as it does when it considers the extension of such benefits
to employees.- 1 52 Indeed, "[b]enefits would never be extended to
spouses," the court claimed, "if the extension did not serve an employment-related purpose."' 53 Additionally, the court explained that the
first phrase of the PDA brings pregnancy-related disabilities within
Title VII's definition of sex and contains nothing which would intimate that the definition is dependent upon the employment status of
the pregnant female. 54 Thus, the court surmised that the two clauses
read "quite harmoniously" because spousal coverage is employmentrelated and the statutory language in no way indicates that such
coverage falls outside the reach of the statute. 55 The court concluded
its construction of the statutory language by rejecting the argument
that the second clause's reference to "ability or inability to work"
denotes disability and, therefore, employee status. If this were true,
the court pointed out, the statute should continue to read, "as other
employees not so affected" rather than "as other persons not so af56
fected.'
The Fourth Circuit court made no finding with regard to the
legislative history of the PDA other than to excerpt in its decision that
part of the Senate Report which specifically addressed dependents'
benefits. 7 On this point, the court held that even if the issue were
intended to be decided based on existing Title VII principles, there
was no support for the employer's view that the matter should be
decided on the basis of Title VII as it existed prior to the PDA. 5 1 The
court instead applied Title VII as amended by the PDA and thus
found that the employer's health insurance plan was unlawful since
the PDA expressly equated pregnancy-related conditions with sex and
the plan contained a pregnancy-based distinction, hence a sex-based
distinction. 59 Interestingly enough, the court did not express an opinion concerning the validity of the EEOC's guidelines.
'5

Id.
Id.
154 Id.
152
153

155

S
157

Id.
Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).

Id.

158 Id.
151 Id. Judge Hall, in a brief dissent, maintained that the statutory reference to "ability or
inability to work" indicated that "the pregnant woman, by logical necessity, must also be an
employee." Id. at 451-52 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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In affirming the district court in Lockheed Missiles, the Ninth
Circuit court interpreted the statutory language in a drastically different manner. The court integrated the language of the PDA with the
language of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII and concluded that this
integration made unlawful those employment practices which discriminate "because of such individual's . ..pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions.' 60 The court stated that the first part of
the statute applied only to female employees and the second part
merely clarified its application in other than definitional terms. 11 The
court supported its holding by referring to that part of the Senate
Report which specifically addressed spousal benefits and determined
that it demonstrated that Congress was aware of the issue but had
intentionally decided to ignore it. 6 2 The court concluded, therefore,
that the PDA had created an exception to Title VII's basic principles
63
only insofar as female employees were concerned.1
The Lockheed Missiles court then applied the basic principles of
Title VII as they existed prior to the PDA and determined that under
the Gilbert/Geduldigrationale the dividing line between favored and
64
disfavored groups must be drawn strictly on the basis of gender.
The court apparently found that no such categorization was present
with regard to spousal benefits and held that the Lockheed plan was
not discriminatory. 615 It offered no explanation for its decision that the
matter was to be decided pursuant to Title VII principles as they
existed at the time the PDA was enacted. 6 6 Yet, unlike the Fourth
Circuit court in Newport News, the Ninth Circuit court did address
the EEOC's guidelines, albeit by way of footnote.6 7 The court accorded no weight to the guidelines, however, holding that the EEOC's
answer to its question 21 was not a contemporaneous interpretation of
the PDA but rather a mistaken view of pre-existing Title VII principles. 168
V.

SPOUSAL BENEFITS AND EXISTING TITLE VII PRINCIPLES

Although the matter is purely conjectural, the decisions of the
courts which have considered the spousal benefit issue evidence two
"* 680 F.2d
'6
62

at 1245 (quoting PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (emphasis added).

Id.

Id. at 1245-46.

Id. at 1246.
Io'
164

Id.

Id. at 1246-47. While the Lockheed Missiles court did not expressly make this finding, it is
set forth as a necessary antecedent to a conclusion that gender-based discrimination is present.
See id.
166 Id. at 1247.
167 Id. at 1246 n.3.
'65

168 Id. See supra note 96.
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types of judicial "backlash" to Congress' overruling of Gilbert. On the
one hand, the courts which have found that the insurance plans at
issue do not violate Title VII have steadfastly relied upon that part of
Gilbert which, they claim, was left untouched by the PDA.' 69 Indeed,
70
in the face of substantial congressional statements to the contrary, 1
these courts have nevertheless maintained that the PDA altered Gilbert's approach to discrimination based upon pregnancy only insofar
as female employees and applicants for employment are concerned.
This reaction is understandable, considering that for some fourteen
years prior to the passage of the PDA, the shaping of the legal parameters of Title VII's sex provision was left solely to the courts.' 7' On the
other hand, the decision of the Fourth Circuit court in Newport
News, with its narrow interpretation and strict reliance upon the
language of the PDA,' 72 seems to be alerting Congress that it will get
precisely what it drafts in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
This reaction is understandable since the Fourth Circuit court's interpretation of the sex provision was reversed by the Gilbert Court. 173 No
court considering the spousal benefit issue, therefore, has adequately
analyzed this issue. The remainder of this Comment will attempt to
do just that.
In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 74 a recent Title VII case,
the Supreme Court restated the principle that "[a]s in all cases involving statutory construction, 'our starting point must be the language
employed by Congress, ' 75 and we assume 'that the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' ",176 The
Fourth Circuit court in Newport News, however, seemed to carry this
principle to an unwarranted extreme in its conclusion that the bare
language of the statute is dispositive on the spousal benefit issue.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit court in Lockheed Missiles and the district
courts in Joslyn Manufacturing and Emerson Electric maintained that
the language of the PDA is not so clear as to obviate the need to
examine its legislative history. On this threshold point, at least, the

"I This

view is best illustrated by the district court decision in Newport News. See supra text

accompanying notes 114 & 15.
70 The Senate and House committee reports speak as one in their rejection of the majority
decision and rationale in Gilbert. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2-3; HouSE REPORT.
supra note 82, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWs at 4750-51.
171 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
171 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), rev'g 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
174 102 S.Ct. 1534 (1982).
175Id. at 1537 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 422 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)).
171 Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
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approach taken by those courts which would find that the insurance
plans at issue do not violate Title VII seems quite sound.
While it is surely possible to read the first and second clauses of
the PDA harmoniously, as the Fourth Circuit decision in Newport
News so aptly demonstrates, the deductive reasoning required to
achieve this harmony only serves to highlight the tension inherent in
such a reading. If Congress had so clearly intended that the PDA
extend to dependents' benefits, it could have easily said as much.
Instead, it is exceedingly difficult to ignore the observation of the
district court in Joslyn Manufacturing that the statutory language
" employment-related purposes' and 'similar in their ability or inability to work' has a common sense reading that it pertains to women
workers only.' 7 7 At the very least, these words create enough doubt
concerning the reach of the PDA that a consideration of the Act's
pertinent legislative history appears to be absolutely necessary.
Inasmuch as the PDA was Congress' reaction to Gilbert, its
legislative history deals primarily with the plight of pregnant employees. Indeed, the EEOC has admitted "that Congress understandably
focused on the effects of pregnancy-related discrimination on women
workers." 17 8 What is not clear is whether Congress intended the PDA
to require the equalization of spousal benefits. Neither the committee
reports nor the heretofore cited comments made during the respective
floor debates yield a definitive answer to this question.
For instance, when the oft-cited colloquy between Senators
Hatch and Williams is closely inspected, 7 9 it seems apparent from
Senator Williams' responses that he was addressing the nature of the
PDA's impact upon income maintenance plans. 80 These plans, by
their very nature, apply only to employees. Accordingly, the emphasis
given this exchange by the district courts in Joslyn Manufacturing,
Lockheed Missiles, and Emerson Electric is misplaced absent a clear
indication that Senator Williams was discussing the impact of the
PDA in general. Likewise, while the comments of Senators Bayh and
Cranston' 8' only reveal their personal opinions, much can nevertheless
be made of the fact that these were the only legislators to express a
view regarding the application of the PDA to insurance coverage for
pregnant spouses and no other member of Congress challenged their

524 F. Supp. at 1142.
t Brief for Appellant, supra note 108, at 16.
'r
See supra note 93 for the full text of that exchange.
ISO See id. for a definition of income maintenance plans.
177

's'

See supra text accompanying note 94.
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position. 82 Yet, when these most prominent segments of the legislative
history are considered in conjunction with the other, less significant
portions of that history upon which the parties to these cases have
built their opposing arguments,1 83 the balance is hardly tipped. In182 Brief for Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 23, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant En Banc].
183 The EEOC, for instance, argued:
[I]n presenting figures on estimated costs, the American Council of Life Insurance in
both the Senate and the House based its estimate for the cost of medical benefits on
estimates of births to all women in the population because the bill was read as
requiring employers to provide medical costs for deliveries of dependents of male
employees.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 108, at 19.
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company rebutted this argument by noting that
Senator Williams challenged these figures "'because they were not limited to female employees"
and so told the spokesperson for the Counsel, "It]his deals with pregnancy. It only deals with
women employees." Brief for Appellee at 32, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 674 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted. 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411) (quoting Discrimination on the
Basis of Pregnancy, Hearingson S. 995 Before the Subcorn in. on Labor of the Senate Comm. oil
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
The EEOC also raised an interesting argument regarding the portion of the Senate Report
specifically addressing the spousal benefit issue. Senator Jacob Javits, the ranking Republican on
the Senate Committee on Human Resouroes, requested the Administration's position regarding
" 'possible health insurance implications of the bill for maternity and other sex-linked coverage.' " Brief for Appellant En Banc, supra note 182, at 27 (quoting Letter from Jacob Javits to
the EEOC, Department of Labor, and Department of Justice (June 6, 1977)). The following
response was made:
"We offer the following interpretations which we believe would be most in accord
with general Title VII principles, in the absence of any specific legislative history or
change in language. Because the plain language of the bill mandates that all employees must be treated the same with regard to all terms and conditions of employment,
including fringe benefit programs, and provides that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex, we believe that the present language
of the bill would prohibit the exclusion of pregnancy coverage from a medical
insurance program offered to employees, as well as prohibit any limitation on
benefits for pregnancy or related medical conditions unless such limitations are
imposed on all other medical conditions. And since medical insurance programs
would have to cover medical costs arising out of pregnancy and related conditions
for female employees, general Title VII and Equal Pay Act principles would require
coverage of similar costs imposed upon male employees by virtue of the pregnancy of
their wives."
Id. at 28 (quoting Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton, Drew S. Days III, and Carin Claus to
Jacob Javits (June 16, 1977)).
In a subsequent letter, the Government clarified the last sentence of the above statement
explaining:
"That sentence, which expressed our view that the additional medical insurance
required by the bill for female employees would be required for the wives of male
employees, is only applicable where the employer maintains an otherwise comprehensive health insurance plan covering both employees and their dependents. It
would not apply where the employer offers health insurance to employees only. In
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deed, whether congressional treatment of spousal benefits is portrayed
as neglect or a simple failure to focus upon an inevitable and important issue, the most appropriate conclusion is simply that a "yes" or
"no" answer to the question does not emerge from the pertinent
legislative history.
What does emerge from the legislative history of the PDA is a
starting point that has existed all along. That is, the Senate Report's
conclusion that if a spousal benefit question were to arise, it would
have to be resolved on the basis of existing Title VII principles. 84 In
view of the otherwise inconclusive nature of the PDA's legislative
history, it is difficult to justify looking beyond the Senate committee's
clear and direct statement. Therefore, the district court's conclusion in
Newport News that the only issue "is whether, under the existing
principles of Title VII, it is an unlawful employment act for an
employer to provide disability coverage for dependents of employees
but exclude from that coverage the pregnancy-related expenses of
spouses of male employees" seems entirely appropriate. 185
Courts which have analyzed the issue pursuant to existing Title
VII principles have differed in their selection and application of these
principles. 8 " The principal point of disagreement is whether some
part of the majority opinion in Gilbert retains its vitality or whether
the reasoning of the dissenters in Gilbertshould control. On this point,
the latter view seems to be most sound.
Although the Senate and House committee reports are uniform in
their disapproval of Gilbert and its rationale, 8 7 the reports further
state that the dissenting opinions correctly expressed the principles of
those circumstances, it would not be necessary to cover the medical costs of a
dependent wife's pregnancy.
We might also point out that this precise issue has never been adjudicated and
that our statement simply reflects our view as to what the bill would require."
Id. (quoting Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton, Carin Claus, and James P. Turner to Jacob
Javits (June 28, 1977)).
The Senate Committee's Report on the bill was subsequently issued on July 6, 1977. As
might be expected, the EEOC cited the "striking parallelism" between the Government's position and the statements contained in the Senate Report on the spousal benefit issue and argued
that "judicial deference" to the Senate Report is "particularly appropriate here" since the
committee had advance notice of the Government's position and did not oppose that position.
See id. at 26-33.
114 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
1 510 F. Supp. at 70.
186 See, e.g., supra notes 114-17 & 135-39 and accompanying text. These courts have even
disagreed as to whether pre-PDA or post-PDA principles should be applied. The Emerson
Electric court and the circuit court in Lockheed Missiles have taken the former position while the
circuit court in Newport News has opted for the latter position. See supra notes 145, 158 & 164
and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 170.
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Title VII. 88 Since the Gilbert majority and dissenting opinions conflict so dramatically in both their reasoning and result, it is simply not
possible to observe these congressional directives while attaching residual authority to Gilbert-allegedly left unchanged by the PDA. As
such, application of Title VII principles to the spousal benefit question
seems to require an analysis of the challenged insurance plans pursuant to the principles enunciated by the Gilbert dissenters and any
other Title VII principles which impact upon the issue. In addition,
judicial consideration of the matter will not be complete unless the
EEOC's guidelines are evaluated for their persuasive value.
The proper analysis of the spousal benefit issue begins by recognizing that spousal insurance coverage flows to the employee for Title
VII purposes. 8 9 The Supreme Court has similarly recognized this
principle in the context of equal protection clause challenges to various federal statutes. 1 0 In addition, it has been held that insurance
benefits are considered compensation for Title VII purposes thereby
invoking the protection of section 703(a).' 9 1
As a result of the operation of the plans at issue, a male employee
will be required to pay, out of pocket, for the noncovered pregnancyrelated expenses of his spouse. 9 2 Since only male employees can have a
pregnant spouse, it is proper to conclude that this burden can only fall
upon male employees. While these plans are typically gender-neutral
on their face, speaking in terms of dependent coverage, the irrefutable
fact is that only male employees can experience a spousal pregnancy
and this is so precisely because of their sex. As such, the existence of a
gender-based disproportionate impact should be apparent.

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981) (health insurance plan
providing spousal coverage only if employee earned more than 50% of combined income per se
violation of Title VII due to disproportionate impact upon female employees).
110See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1977) (Social Security Act requirement
that wage earner's widower prove he was receiving at least one-half support from his wife when
she died in order to receive survivor's benefits violates equal protection clause); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 646-47 (1974) (Social Security Act provisions providing survivor's
benefits of deceased male wage earner to widow and couple's minor children but providing
survivor's benefits of deceased female wage earner only to minor children violates equal protection clause); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1972) (federal statutes requiring
female but not male members of uniformed services to prove spouse or dependent relies on her
for over 50 % of support in order to claim him as dependent for purposes of obtaining increased
quarters' allowances and medical and dental benefits violates equal protection clause).
"I See, e.g., Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Va. 1977),
afJ'd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978).
"' Brief for Appellant En Banc, supra note 182, at 14, 17.
'8

'8
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Gilbert-like arguments made by the Emerson Electric court 19 3
and the Ninth Circuit court in Lockheed Missiles, 9 4 have no basis
upon which to stand. First, this type of analytical approach to genderbased discrimination utterly offends the common sense view espoused
by Justice Brennan in Gilbert in response to the majority's creation
and use of potential recipient categories. 5 The insurance coverage
limitation is as strongly sex-related to male employees as the pregnancy exclusion in Gilbert was to female employees. Whereas in
Gilbert, only female employees could experience the uncovered condition, here only male employees can ever bear the costs associated with
a spousal pregnancy."' Furthermore, even if the use of potential
recipient categories were appropriate, and Manhart's emphasis upon
the individual seems to indicate otherwise," 7 these categories should
at least mirror reality. The appropriate comparison is between those
employees with spouses who are not and never will become pregnant
and those employees with spouses who are or may become pregnant.
These categories of employees are strictly drawn on the basis of sex
and serve to highlight the inherently disproportionate impact which
the spousal pregnancy exclusion or limitation has upon male employees.
More importantly, none of the courts which has decided the issue
thus far has deemed it appropriate to consider the impact of Manhart
in its discussion of existing Title VII principles. This omission is surprising since Manhart represents the Supreme Court's most recent
holding concerning gender-based discrimination. This omission is
even more curious, however, in light of Justice Blackmun's clear
indication, in his partial concurrence in Manhart, that the case represents a significant shift in the Court's analytical approach to gender9 8
based discrimination.
The major principle emanating from Manhart is that Title VII's
protection against discrimination in employment runs to individuals,
See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
Moreover, just as the Supreme Court has held that white employees may allege Title VII
race discrimination, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976), courts
have held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against males as well as females in the area of
fringe benefits. See, e.g., EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978) (life insurance
benefits); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976) (retirement benefits);
Fitzpatrick v. Biter, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975) (retirement benefits), rev'd on other grounds,
427 U.S. 445 (1976); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973)
(retirement benefits); Diaz v. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.) (fringe benefits), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
'o
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
'o
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
'o'
'0
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not classes. 99 This proposition is wholly at odds with Gilbert's pregnant persons versus nonpregnant persons and Emerson Electric's employees with pregnant spouses versus employees without pregnant
spouses dichotomies. The ManhartCourt further noted that in observing Title VII's basic policy of fairness to individuals, "there is no
reason to believe that Congress intended a special definition of discrimination in the context of employee group insurance coverage. 200
Thus, while not every male employee will be forced to cover the costs
of a spousal pregnancy with his earnings, only male employees will be
so affected and therefore discriminated against.
Finally, while it is not the purpose of this Comment to determine
the quantum of judicial deference owed the EEOC guidelines, 20 ' the
primary objections raised by Justice Rehnquist in Gilbert concerning
the 1972 guidelines 20 2 are not present in the 1979 guidelines. While
the spousal benefit guidelines do not find definitive support in the
PDA's legislative history, 20 3 they are not contradicted by that history
and are in apparent accord with the principles of Title VII. Further,
their propriety can only have been aided by the conclusion of both the
Senate and House committees that the rejected 1972 guidelines were,
indeed, proper.
It is, therefore, this writer's view that a limitation upon spousal
pregnancy-related insurance coverage violates Title VII where otherwise comprehensive dependent coverage is provided by the employer.
This violation does not arise as a direct result of the PDA, which is
unclear on the issue, but rather as a consequence of the application of
basic Title VII principles as set forth by the Gilbert dissenters and the
Manhart Court. Moreover, the previously discussed spousal benefit
decisions evidence substantial confusion among the federal courts regarding gender-based discrimination. Since the spousal benefit issue

191See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that Title VII was violated by a retirement plan which required equal contributions from
males and females but paid less monthly benefits to females based on mortality tables. Spirt v.
TIAA, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1599 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit court stated:
In the time elasped since its decision in Manhart the Supreme Court has not modified
in any way its focus on "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes,". . . in
Title VII cases. To the contrary . . . "[i]t is clear that Congress never intended to
give an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race
or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employee's group."
Id. at 1605 (citations omitted).
200 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710.
101See supra note 26.
202 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
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will be considered by the Supreme Court,20 4 the opportunity exists for
the Court to provide much needed clarification to this aspect of Title
VII law.
Richard I. Delello
204 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), afJ'd per curiam, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).

